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Abstract
By forecasting overly optimistic revenues opportunistic governments can increase
spending in order to appear more competent prior to elections. Ex post deficits emerge
in election years, thereby producing political forecast cycles - as also found for US
states in the empirical literature. In our theoretical moral hazard model we obtain
three additional results which are tested with panel data for Portuguese municipalities.
The extent of manipulations is reduced when (i) the winning margin is expected to
widen; (ii) the incumbent is not re-running; and/or (iii) the share of informed voters
(proxied by education) goes up.
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1 Introduction
The motivation for this paper is twofold. First and more specifically, there is evidence that
governments use revenue forecasts to expand their fiscal room for manoeuvre in election
years in order to increase their chances of re-election. Boylan (2008) showed for 49 US
states with constitutional balanced budget constraints for the period from 1988 to 2004
that the state revenue growth forecast error is 2.2 % higher in election years.1 Second, and
more generally, there is evidence that governments try to influence the international and
domestic public’s perception of fiscal conditions, especially during election years. Greece
and other European countries cheated to hide ”excessive” public debt and/or deficits so
that they could gain access to the European Monetary Union and/or fulfill the criteria laid
out by the European Stability and Growth Pact.
This paper presents a political economy model which focuses on an opportunistic government
and a partially uninformed electorate. The incumbent government can manipulate revenue
forecasts in order to be able to increase spending and, thereby expand its provision of public
goods. This is a hidden effort because uninformed voters do not understand the reason for
the expansion and attribute it to government competence, thereby raising the government’s
re-election chances.2 Since forecasts and budgets are larger in election years, we obtain
political forecast and budget cycles. Not only do we offer a theoretical mechanism which
can explain the results found in the earlier empirical literature on forecast manipulation,
but we also provide additional evidence in the same vein. Our own empirical analysis based
on data from Portuguese municipalities for the period 1998-2017 confirms the existence of
1 Election year forecast optimism is also found, for instance, by Heinemann (2006) with respect to
(federal) deficit forecasts in Germany from 1969 to 2003; by Kauder et al. (2017) with respect to spending
forecasts in election years by East German state governments; by Boukari and Veiga (2018) with respect to
revenue and expenditure forecasts in France and Portugal from 1998 to 2015. Bru¨ck and Stephan (2006)
argue that forecast optimism may have increased in the eurozone since the introduction of the Stability and
Growth Pact.
2 Earlier theoretical moral hazard papers in which a government can appear more competent by manip-
ulating a (partially) uninformed electorate are Lohmann (1998), for political business cycles, and Shi and
Svensson (2006) for political budget cycles) In Bohn (2019) the government uses its incumbent advantage
to affect the beliefs of the electorate.
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forecast manipulations in election years. An array of robustness tests suggests that the
evidence is rather solid.
In addition, this paper investigates the factors that are conducive to increasing the forecast
manipulation even further. In the theoretical model we obtain the following results. First, a
larger ex ante expected winning margin allows the incumbent to reduce its revenue forecast
which leads to a lower level of costly indebtedness. Second, if the government is not running,
its own interest in winning the elections is reduced. Again, the motivation for high indebt-
edness is reduced. Third, if there are more uninformed voters, any manipulation is more
effective. Hence the government will expand its effective tool and choose higher revenue
forecasts. These findings are supported by the empirical analysis. The expected winning
margin is proxied by the previous election winning margin. Uninformedness is captured by
alternative education proxies. There is overwhelming evidence, both in the main results and
in a battery of robustness tests, in support of our theoretical predictions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and its
solution and presents Propositions 1 to 3. Details are given in the appendix. The empirical
model is set out in Section 3 and the results are presented in Section 4. Additional robustness
tests can be found in the appendix. Section 5 concludes.
2 Political Forecast Cycle Model
The model captures an incumbent government which has some leverage over its revenue
forecasts. It can manipulate them in order to expand its public services with the hope of
convincing voters of being more competent and, thereby, increasing its re-election chances.
Voters can be informed or uninformed about the government forecasts. If they are informed
they can use this information to deduce government competence. If they are uninformed
they have to form expectations. Overall, the model is of the Shi and Svensson (2006)
and Bohn (2018) type; it captures moral hazard of an opportunistic government thereby
producing political cycles.
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Preferences
Every alternate period two opportunistic politicians run for office, an incumbent a and a
challenger b. Individual voter i’s utility depends on economic and non-economic considera-
tions:
U it =
∞∑
s=t
(βi)s−tEs[us(cs) +G+s + αχ
izs] with χ
i = θi − γ. (1)
The intertemporal utility function for any voter i comprises additively-separable utility from
private consumption, us(cs), utility from public consumption G
+
s , with unity marginal utility
(a simplification also used by Shi and Svensson, 2006), and a non-economic component χizs,
with relative weight α, in each period. Formally, discounting between periods is included
here, but can be ignored later on because it does not contribute to substance nor exposition
as will be seen further down. Utility derived from sympathy represents any attribute of the
candidates that does not affect economic policies, be it their stance on societal issues or
their good looks. It reflects more or less strong sympathy for one of the two candidates.
Without limiting the generality of the analysis we assume that support for incumbent a is
depicted by negative values of χi, support for challenger b by positive values. Sympathy
utility is constrained to χizs ∈ [−12 − γ, 12 − γ] since zt is either −12 (when incumbent a
is elected) or +1
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(when challenger b is elected); the personal sympathy parameter θi is
uniformly distributed over the interval [−1, 1]; and γ is a shift parameter.3
Both politicians j = a, b face a utility function similar to the one for voters consisting, again,
of an economic and, if the politician is in power, a non-economic component. The non-
economic component is, however, different and includes both a political rent and political
3 If voter i has somewhat more sympathies for incumbent a, say at χi = − 12 , then her utility derived
from sympathy is positive ( 14 ), if the incumbent is elected (zs = − 12 ); but it is negative (− 14 ), if challenger
b is elected (zs =
1
2 ). If γ = 0, incumbent and challenger have equal chances of being elected; with γ > 0,
the incumbent has higher chances.
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(reputation) costs:
V jt =
∞∑
s=t
V js =
∞∑
s=t
(βj)s−tEs[us(cs) +G+s + IsXs − Is−1IsξsD2s−1], j = a, b. (2)
Ir =

1 if in power in period r
0 otherwise
Both politicians are concerned about private and public consumption. In addition, politician
a (in power) receives ego rent Xs and bears reputation costs (ξsD
2
s−1), if she was also in
power in the previous period. Reputation costs rise overproportionally (squared) with the
previous period deviation (Ds−1 > 0) from a balanced budget4 (Ds−1 = 0).5
For voters and politicians alike, period t consumption ct is modelled to depend upon trend
output y¯ and any deviation of output y+t . For simplification, the taxes (and expenditures)
for trend output are not explicitly studied, but would not change the analysis; note, however,
that deadweight loss and distributional effects are ignored. We only consider adjustments
of taxes for deviations of output, hence each agent’s additional net-of-tax income (1− τ)y+t
in the consumption function:
ct = y¯ + (1− τ)y+t = y¯ + (1− τ)
R+t
τ
. (3)
The deviation from trend output, y+t , is a random variable with mean Et[y
+
t ] = 0 and
variance σ2. For a constant tax rate, it can also be expressed in terms of additional revenue
the government receives, R+t , which is also a random variable with mean zero.
4 Alternatively, deviations from a prespecified deficit target D¯ (i.e. Ds−1 > D¯) could also be modelled,
but would produce the same qualitative results.
5 Leaving reputation costs out would not contradict any of the findings of this paper, but would require
the inclusion of subjective discount rates and a careful discussion of interest (debt repayment) versus discount
rates. – The quadratic form is the simplest way of capturing how the government’s trustworthiness and
credibility are affected. The legislature and social groups the government has to deal with may ”tolerate”
small, but not large, deviations and dislike both surpluses and deficits.
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Fiscal policy and competence
The planned government budget constraint is expressed in terms of additional public goods,
G+t , supplied by the government:
G+t = R
+
t
forec − (1 + rt−1)(Dt−1) + ηjt ; (4)
By making overly optimistic revenue forecasts, R+t
forec
, for random variable R+t the in-
cumbent can manipulate the amount of public goods she supplies to voters. The variable
R+t
forec
is thus the incumbent’s instrument and forms the basis for her budget calculations.
To fulfill the balanced budget requirement (thereby avoiding a political cost next period)
the government has to repay its previous period deficit Dt−1 including interest at exogenous
rate rt−1.
The amount of public goods any government j can supply also depends on j’s positive
or negative competence shock, ηjt . Competence could be interpreted, for instance, as tax
collection efficiency or public goods provision efficiency. Competence ηjt consists of a skills
shocks for the current period and another one for the previous period:
ηjt = µ
j
t + µ
j
t−1. (5)
Hence competence persistence is modelled as an MA(1) process.6 Each skills shock µjt is
a random variable with mean 0, distribution function F (µjt) = F (•) and density function
f(µjt) = f(•) = F ′(•) which is (weakly) monotonously increasing up to the mean.7 Past
shocks are common knowledge, but current or future shocks are unknown to both politicians
6 Limited persistence is a compromise. It allows some persistence while acknowledging that competence
also changes over time as new tasks for politicians emerge. For persistence longer than 1 period, the model
would not be easily solvable. Rogoff and Sibert (1988)’s and Rogoff (1990)’s suggestion of an MA(1) process
is one of two conditions (the other being the assumption of debt being costly) for splitting the model into
separate 2-period cycles as is common in this literature. Each cycle consists of an election period and an
off-election period. The timing of events (page 6) and the role of these assumptions is outlined further down.
7 For more unusual density functions (for instance, with F ′′(µat ) < 0 for some µ
a
t ≤ 0), we could get
ambiguous results. However, the limiting case of F ′′(µat ) = 0 for some µ
a
t ≤ 0 or even over the entire range
(uniform distribution) is acceptable.
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and voters. Even the incumbent does not know her own current competence – an idea sug-
gested by Shi and Svensson (2006) – because she always faces new tasks and challenges (like
the financial crisis or the European refugee crisis) or wants to start new programmes and
cannot foresee how efficiently she can manage them. Not knowing her own competence, any
incumbent has an incentive to provide additional public goods in order to appear more com-
petent and increase her re-election chances. Since politicians do not have an informational
advantage, there is no signalling, only moral hazard.
The government deficit is obtained residually because forecast revenues are committed ac-
cording to Equation (4), but actual revenues deviate; we can also determine the expected
deficit given Eat [R
+
t ] = 0:
Dt ≡ R+t forec −R+t ; (6)
Eat [Dt] = R
+
t
forec
. (7)
Since the incumbent hopes to facilitate augmented public services in order to increase re-
election chances, she accepts (and expects) a positive deficit.
Timing of events
The timing of events is summarised in Table 1. In election period t, everybody observes
last period’s deficit Dt−1 and past skills shock µat−1. On this basis, incumbent a chooses
its forecast of additional revenue R+t
forec
, thus determining the amount of additional public
goods G+t it can provide according to Equation (4). All voting individuals observe G
+
t ,
but only informed voters can also observe and make use of the state government’s policy
choice of the forecast of additional revenue R+t
forec
. They can, therefore, deduce current
skills µat , thereby extracting information about the future competence of the incumbent
(since ηat+1 = µ
a
t+1 + µ
a
t ). Uninformed voters can only form expectations of the incumbent’s
current skills, µ̂at based on their perception of the government forecast of additional revenue,
R̂+t
forec
. Then all voters cast their votes based on their different information sets and their
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different beliefs of µat . What matters is that a share of voters is uninformed, even though
they are rational in the end. If government policy could be correctly observed by all voters,
the government would gain nothing from manipulating the forecast and from expanding
public goods.
Table 1: The Timing of Events.
All voters and
incumbent a observe:
- last period’s deficit
Dt−1
- the incumbent’s last
period skills
µat−1
Incumbent a:
- chooses forecast of
additional revenue
R+t
forec
- and provides additional
public goods
G+t
All voters observe:
- additional public
goods
G+t
Informed voters
observe:
- the incumbent’s
forecast of
additional
revenue
R+t
forec
Informed voters:
- deduce the incumbent’s current skills
µat
- and vote.
Uninformed voters:
- form expectations of the incumbent’s
current period skills
µ̂at
(based on rational expectations
of the incumbent’s forecast of
additional revenue
R̂+t
forec
)
- and vote.
The winner of the
period t elections
takes office and
receives an ego rent.
If the incumbent
stays in office, she
suffers a reputation
loss for a period t
budget deficit.
The winner repays
the deficit of the
previous year.
Period t Period t+1
In period (t+ 1), the winner (incumbent or challenger) takes office and receives an ego rent.
If the incumbent stays in office, she also suffers a reputation loss amounting to disutility
ξtD
2
t−1 for not having achieved a balanced budget. A government found to have cheated
may be in a weaker position in negotiations with the legislature and social groups. However,
voters are no longer relevant for the politician’s decision making in (t + 1) because they
cannot vote in period (t + 1). Politicians have no incentive for manipulating their forecast
of additional revenue R+t
forec
. They want to repay the previous period deficit because the
deficit is costly8 and voters cannot sanction the politician for producing a negative amount
8 Repayment is guaranteed for two reasons. Firstly, because of the aforementioned reputation loss.
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of additional public goods, thereby financing deficit repayment. Given that voters are only
concerned about politicians’ competence after the election it does not matter that voters
anticipate in election period t that any politician will repay the deficit in the off-election
period (t+1). Note also that voters do not consider expected utility in (t+2) in their voting
decision in t, because even informed voters cannot distinguish between the incumbent and
her challenger in (t + 2) (competence is an MA(1) process only). Politicians, too, are not
concerned about the more distant future, because they have no instrument for affecting
utility or re-election chances in (t+ 2). The model can, therefore, be split in 2-period cycles
consisting of an election period (period t) and an off-election period (period t+ 1). See also
Footnote 6.
Incumbent’s probability of winning
The incumbent maximises her expected utility in t and t+1 (whereby the discount rate can
be set to 0 for simplicity). The t+ 1 utility depends on the probability of the incumbent of
winning the election. First, we must, therefore, determine the probability that an individual
agent votes for incumbent a. We assume prospective voting, i.e. voting depends on whether
a voter expects the incumbent or the challenger to deliver a higher level of utility after
the elections, i.e. in t + 1. This depends on two components: (i) on the voter’s sympathy
χi = θi − γ towards the candidates; and (ii) on who can deliver more public goods which,
in turn, depends on the politicians’ skills in periods t and t+ 1. Agents do not know future
skills of incumbent or challenger; nor can they observe any skills of the challenger in period
t. However, they may have expectations on the incumbent’s skills (Et[µ
a
t ]) based on her
performance in office in period t. It is shown in Appendix A that an individual agent votes
for incumbent a, if the following inequality holds: An individual agent votes for incumbent
Secondly, technically, because the marginal utility of additional deficit-financed public goods in t is 1 (if the
subjective discount factor is set to 1 for simplicity), whereas its marginal cost and, therefore, the marginal
disutility is (1 + rt), i.e. greater than 1. The unity marginal public goods utility assumption is also used by
Shi and Svensson (2006).
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a, if the following inequality holds:
Et[µ
a
t ] > α(θ
i − γ). (8)
First, suppose shift parameter γ is zero, then ex ante incumbent and challenger have an equal
chance of winning the election. However, even if incumbent a is expected to be (slightly)
less skilled than average, i.e. Et[µ
a
t ] < 0, a voter will vote for incumbent a, if the voter is
sufficiently sympathetic towards the incumbent (remember that θi < 0 indicates sympathy
for incumbent a and α is a positive weight). Conversely, even if a voter is sympathetic
towards the challenger (θi > 0), the incumbent could still be chosen, if the incumbent is
expected to exhibit sufficiently strong (above average) skills. Second, with shift parameter
γ negative, it is easier for the incumbent to convince voters to vote for her; it requires a
lower level of expected skill, Et[µ
a
t ] < 0.
On this basis, we derive (in the appendix) the probability for the incumbent to win the
election:
Prob
 (1− ψ) [
Einft [µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1 + γ
2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
informed
+ψ [
Euninft [µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1 + γ
2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
uninformed
≥ 1
2
 . (9)
The probability depends on whether informed voters (share (1−ψ)) and uninformed voters
(share ψ) think that the incumbent’s skills are above average (Et[µ
a
t ] > 0) or not. The
difference for informed and uninformed voters occurs because informed voters have all the
information for deducing µat from the period t planned government budget constraint (4);
uninformed voters do not. Uninformed voters do not observe the forecast of additional
revenue R+t
forec
; instead, they have to use their perception of the forecast of additional
revenue R̂+t
forec
. Hence, their mistake amounts to R̂+t
forec−R+t forec – as shown in Appendix
B. On this basis, we can derive the incumbent’s probability of winning Probwin:
Probwin = Prob
{
µat ≥ ψ (R̂+t forec −R+t forec)− αγ
}
(10)
= 1 − F [ ψ (R̂+t forec −R+t forec) − αγ] , (11)
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where F (•) is the distribution function of the skills shock. Note that this equation shows
that, in equilibrium, the incumbent cannot increase her winning probability by using forecast
manipulations, if we assume rational expectations. For γ = 0, we obtain Probwin = 1 −
F [0] = 1
2
in equilibrium.
Incumbent’s decision problem
To determine the governments policy choice, we maximise the incumbent’s expected utility
over any 2-period cycle, i.e. period t utility plus period (t + 1) utility in case of winning
the election multiplied by the probability of winning (as determined in step 2) plus period
(t+ 1) utility in case of losing multiplied by the probability of losing:
max
R+t
forec V = max
R+t
forec V at + V
a
t+1 =
max
R+t
forec Eat { ut(y¯ + (1− τ)
R+t
τ
) +G+t +Xt − ξD2t−1 }
+ Eat { Probwin [ut+1(y¯ + (1− τ)
R+t+1
τ
) +G+t+1 +Xt+1 − ξD2t ] }
+ Eat { (1− Probwin) [ut+1(y¯ + (1− τ)
R+t+1
τ
) +G+t+1] }. (12)
See Appendix C for a more detailed exposition of Equation (12) and the following steps. The
government’s optimal choice of its forecast of additional revenue R+t
forec
can be characterised
by the first order condition (FOC) given that the second order condition holds. Under
rational expectations this becomes:
−rt + F ′[−αγ]ψ[Xt+1 − ξ(R+t forec)2]− [1− F [−αγ]]2ξR+t forec = 0, (13)
The first term of rational expectations condition (13), −rt, is the marginal direct effect of
the government’s forecast of additional revenue on the deficit, which is negative because
deficit including repayment is costly. The (additional) revenue forecast is optimally chosen
by the government, when the marginal direct effect on the deficit (first term) equals the
10
net effect on the expected return if the incumbent stays in power (second and third terms).
The latter consists of countervailing effects. The second term depicts the positive marginal
impact of higher forecasts on the perceived skills of the incumbent and thus on the voting
probability of receiving the (given) expected net return (Xt+1−ξ[R+t forec]2). The third term
captures the negative marginal impact of increased forecasts on the punishment for the lost
reputation (since the deficit will be increasing) given the chance of winning the elections.
Rational expectations condition (13) states that the government wants to increase its fore-
cast of additional revenue until the marginal deficit cost together with the punishment effect
(which is very small for low levels of forecast manipulation) exceeds the marginal benefit
from spending on public goods which translates into a marginal benefit from increasing the
chances of winning. In other words, the first key result of the paper is that there are political
forecast cycles ; forecasts are increased in election years. This also implies higher deficits
which are repaid in off-election years. Hence, there is also a political budget cycle. The
mechanism is similar to the one in the political budget cycle model by Shi and Svensson
(2006). There is moral hazard because a hidden effort (deficit in Shi and Svensson; and
forecasts here) is used by the government for expanding public goods and trying to improve
re-election chances.
But how is the government’s optimal choice of its forecast manipulation affected by exoge-
nous aspects of the model? In particular, we would like to know (see next section) the effect
of an increased winning margin (captured by a higher shift parameter γ; see Proposition 1),
the consequences of an incumbent who is not re-running (embodied by a lower ego rent for
the time after the elections, Xt+1; see Proposition 2), and the effect of increasing the share
of uninformed voters (higher ψ; see Proposition 3).
Three testable propositions
Proposition 1 - The Winning Margin.
A larger winning margin γ decreases the optimal revenue forecast by the incumbent at the
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equilibrium.
d(R+t
forec
)
∗
dγ
< 0.
Proof: See Appendix D.
A larger winning margin allows the government to avoid costly deficits both in terms of
repayment and reputation costs.
Proposition 2 - When the Incumbent is not Re-running.
When the incumbent is not re-running (Xt+1 reduced), the optimal revenue forecast by the
incumbent is reduced at the equilibrium.
d(R+t
forec
)
∗
dXt+1
> 0.
Proof: See Appendix D.
If the incumbent does not benefit from winning so much any more, winning becomes less
important. No longer does it pay to incur high deficit repayment and reputation costs.
Proposition 3 - The Share of Uninformed Voters.
A larger share of uninformed voters ψ increases the optimal revenue forecast by the incum-
bent at the equilibrium.
d(R+t
forec
)
∗
dψ
> 0.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Manipulation works because uninformed voters can be tricked. If more of them can be
cheated, the manipulation instrument becomes more effective. Hence it is used more.
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3 Data, Setting, and Empirical Model
This section describes the data, the institutional setting for Portuguese municipalities, and
the empirical model which are used for testing the implications (propositions) obtained
for the model of Section 2.
Data and Institutional Setting
Detailed fiscal data for the 308 municipalities was obtained from the Directorate General
of Local Authorities (DGAL), information regarding the dates and results of local elections
and on mayors’ characteristics from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and demographic and
economic data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) and from Marktest’s Sales Index
database. Our dataset covers the period from 1998 to 2017, for which DGAL’s data on
municipal initial budgets is available. Five local elections took place during our sample
period (2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, and 2017).
Municipalities are the highest subnational government level in mainland Portugal, and the
second in the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira, which have regional governments.
All municipalities are subject to the same laws and regulations, have the same responsibili-
ties for public service provision,9 and have the same institutional structure. Regarding the
latter, the Town Council (Caˆmara Municipal) holds the executive power, while the Munic-
ipal Assembly holds the deliberative power, approving, among other things, the municipal
budgets and plans of activities. Voters elect the members of both chambers directly, by cast-
ing their votes on closed party or independent lists of candidates. The top candidate of the
most voted list for the Town Council becomes the mayor, presides that chamber and plays a
leading role in the executive, having substantial power and autonomy. Municipal elections
are held every four years, in all municipalities at the same time, generally in October (they
were held in December until 2001). Although other elections sometimes occurred in the
9 Distribution of water, sewage, basic schooling, local health care, social housing, local transportation and
communication, property maintenance, promotion of culture and science, recreation and sports facilities,
environmental protection, and municipal policing.
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same year, national, regional, or European elections were never concurrent with municipal
elections.
Local governments have financial autonomy, not needing approval from a higher-ranked
authority to elaborate and approve their own budgets and final accounts. Nevertheless,
most of them heavily depend on grants from the central government or from the European
Union (own revenues account, on average, for just one third of total effective revenues).
The municipal budget is drafted by the mayor’s team, analysed by the Town Council, and
approved by the Municipal Assembly, in the last quarter of the year prior to the relevant
fiscal year (which corresponds to the calendar year). Municipalities are allowed to run
budget deficits, but there are legal limits to the stock of municipal debt.
Empirical Models
The theoretical model’s main result is that there are political forecast cycles. Revenue fore-
casts are more optimistic in election years (see discussion of rational expectations condition
13 in Section 2). This is tested with the following empirical model (henceforth baseline
model):
R+foreci,t = β1R
+forec
i,t−1 + β2Elect
′
i,t + β3X
′
i,t + νi + σt + ξi,t, (14)
where R+foreci,t is the forecast of additional revenue, here proxied by the difference between the
revenue forecast for year t (taken from the initial municipal budget) and the average revenues
of municipality i over the previous 4 years, in real euros (of 2015) per capita;10 Electi,t is a
vector of three electoral dummy variables (the year before the election, the election year, and
the year after); Xi,t is a vector of control variables which may affect forecasted revenues; νi
represents unobserved municipality-specific effects; σt represents time-specific effects;11 and
10 Average past revenues are publicly available information which may help (informed) voters assess
whether the forecast for year t is above normal or not. One alternative would be to use forecast errors,
but the problem is that the actual revenues of year t are not known at the time the forecast is made and
announced (in t − 1). Nevertheless, as shown in the robustness tests (see Table E.3 in Appendix E), the
empirical results are practically the same when we use forecast errors in revenues as the dependent variable.
11 Since the election-year dummy would be collinear with yearly dummy variables, we control for time
effects using 4-year mandate dummies.
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ξi,t is the error term.
Based on the theoretical model, on previous empirical evidence of forecast manipulations
(for instance, Boylan, 2008; Bischoff and Gohout, 2010), and on political budget cycles found
for Portuguese municipalities (Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Aidt et al., 2011; Boukari and Veiga,
2018), we expect a positive β2 for the election-year dummy. This means more optimistic
forecasts in election years which, in turn, allow for greater expenditure.
The vector Xi,t includes the following control variables which may affect the degree of manip-
ulation of revenue forecasts: a dummy variable for left-wing mayors, MayorLeft; a dummy
variable, Majority, which takes the value of one when the mayor is supported by majorities
in both the Town Council and the Municipal Assembly, and zero otherwise; the win-margin
of the mayor’s party in the previous election, WinMargin; a dummy variable, RunReelect,
for mayors who run for reelection; the mayor’s number of terms in office, TermsMayor; a
dummy, SameParty, for when the mayor belongs to the main national government party;
the municipal unemployment rate, Unemp; the regional (NUTS III) rate of GDP growth,
GDPgrowth;12 the rate of population growth, PopGrowth; a proxy for municipal financial
autonomy, FinAuton, which corresponds to own revenues as a percentage of total effec-
tive revenues; and, the percentage of the municipal population above 14 years old with no
formal education completed, %NoEduc. All economic, demographic and education control
variables are lagged one year, since their values for year t are not known at the time the
revenue forecast for year t is made.
To test the propositions of the theoretical model, the empirical baseline model (14) is ex-
tended to check for interaction effects with political or educational variables. The following
extension for political variables is used for testing Propositions 1 and 2:
R+foreci,t = β1R
+forec
i,t−1 +β2ElYi,t +β3Poli,t +β4(ElYi,t ∗Poli,t) +β5X′i,t +νi +σt + ξi,t, (15)
12 NUTS is the European Union nomenclature for territorial statistical units. Portugal is subdivided into
three NUTS I regions (Mainland, Azores and Madeira), seven NUTS II regions, and 25 NUTS III regions.
Each NUTS III region aggregates several municipalities, which correspond to the NUTS IV level. There is
no GDP data at the municipal (NUTS IV) level.
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where ElYi,t is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in an election year, and equals
zero in off-election years; Poli,t is a political variable for municipality i in year t; and the
remaining variables are as described above. The political variables of interest include the
margin of victory in the previous election, a dummy for when the mayor runs for reelection,
and dummies for left-wing mayors, for majority governments, and for party similarity with
the national government.
The extension of baseline model (14) to include educational interaction terms replaces the
political variable Poli,t in Equation (15) by education variable Educi,t. It is used for testing
Proposition 3 according to which electoral opportunism is greater in municipalities with
higher shares of uninformed voters (see also Shi and Svensson, 2006). Here is the modified
model:
R+foreci,t = β1R
+forec
i,t−1 +β2ElYi,t+β3Educi,t+β4(ElYi,t∗Educi,t)+β5X′i,t+νi+σt+ξi,t, (16)
where Educi,t is a proxy for the education level of the population of municipality i in year
t, and the remaining variables are as described above. The models presented above are esti-
mated for effective revenues (total revenues excluding loans), current revenues, and capital
revenues (excluding loans), by fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by municipality.
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper are presented in Appendix E (Table
E.1).
4 Empirical Results
Here, we present the results of the empirical analysis, which tests the main predictions of
the theoretical model; we also discuss an array of robustness tests.
Baseline Model: Political Forecast Cycles
The results of the estimation of the baseline model of Equation (14) for the difference be-
tween forecasted and average past revenues (in real euros per capita), by fixed effects, with
16
standard errors clustered by municipality are reported in Table 2. Consistent with our
model’s main theoretical result embodied in the discussion of the rational expectations con-
dition (13), there is evidence of more optimistic effective revenues (total revenues excluding
loans) forecasts in election years. In Column 1, the dummy variable for the election year is
positive and highly statistically significant, with the difference between forecasted effective
revenues and average revenues of the previous four years increasing by 94.5 euros per capita
in an election year when compared to the reference year (the second year of the 4-year term).
Current forecast revenues do not seem to change significantly in election years (Column 2).
In contrast, they are decreased in the year before the election and increased afterwards,
which is not consistent with opportunistic forecasting. The lack of opportunism in current
revenue forecasts may be due to the fact that, for the vast majority of municipalities, central
government formula-determined grants account for most of the current revenues. Since the
amounts to be transferred are announced before municipalities elaborate their budgets, there
is not much room for forecast manipulation in current revenues.
Although some capital grants are also formula-determined, a significant part of government
and European capital transfers are based on project approval. Additionally, the sales of cap-
ital assets such as municipal buildings can in some years account for a large share of capital
revenues. Since voters cannot easily obtain reliable forecasts for these capital revenue items,
the margin of maneuvre for opportunistic forecasting is considerably larger for capital than
for current revenues. This is consistent with the results reported in Column 3, where the
election year dummy variable is positive and highly statistically significant. Therefore, the
political forecast cycles found for total effective revenues in Column 1 seem to be mainly
driven by cycles in capital revenue forecasts. The results also indicate that electoral ma-
nipulation of capital revenue forecasts starts in the year before the election (as also shown
by Veiga and Veiga, 2007, for capital expenditures), although with a considerably smaller
magnitude than in the election year.13
13 Wald tests, not shown here, clearly reject the equality of the coefficients. Since the only year of the
4-year term for which an election dummy is not included is the second year after the election, this is the
reference year against which the others are compared to.
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Table 2: PBCs in Revenue Forecasts - Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Effective Revenues Current Revenues Capital Revenues
L.(Revenue forecast - Average revenues of previous 4 years) 0.520*** 0.465*** 0.543***
(8.888) (4.849) (9.192)
Year before election 14.570 -13.694*** 27.757**
(0.948) (-2.670) (2.080)
Election year 94.497*** -0.459 93.767***
(5.843) (-0.090) (6.396)
Year after election 11.423 16.056*** -5.745
(0.664) (3.117) (-0.361)
Mayor left -32.676 -6.613 -25.624
(-1.426) (-0.772) (-1.303)
Majority -39.491* -13.985* -24.750
(-1.867) (-1.762) (-1.345)
Win margin (previous election) 0.646 0.408* 0.229
(0.865) (1.944) (0.345)
Incumbent running for reelection -25.395 -1.143 -23.436
(-1.313) (-0.171) (-1.343)
Terms mayor -4.993 0.212 -5.046
(-0.856) (0.112) (-0.962)
Same party 20.372* 1.872 18.746*
(1.815) (0.470) (1.857)
L.Unemployment rate -19.654*** -0.874 -18.636***
(-5.285) (-0.688) (-5.300)
L.GDP growth (NUTS III region) 6.985*** -1.320* 8.594***
(3.816) (-1.839) (5.290)
L.Population growth 1.389 -5.586*** 6.577***
(0.497) (-3.250) (2.802)
L.Financial autonomy (Own revenues / Effective revenues) 0.805 -0.610 1.608*
(0.734) (-1.526) (1.655)
L.% Population with no education level completed 27.811*** -3.045 29.299***
(4.756) (-1.376) (4.958)
Observations 5,098 5,098 5,098
Municipalities 308 308 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.24 0.50
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent
variable is the difference between the revenue forecast for year t and the average revenues of the previous four years, in real
euros per capita. T-statistics are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
The lagged dependent variable is always statistically significant, which indicates persistent
differences between forecasts and average past revenues. A sample period of 20 years,
18
and an average of about 17 observations per municipality (due to missing values for some
years), may not be long enough to completely avoid the so-called Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981),
resulting from the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the municipal fixed
effects. One possibility is to estimate the model using a dynamic panel data method such as
the System Generalized Method of Moments (System-GMM), of Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998). But, when using this method, we encountered problems
related to the validity of the instrument matrix.14 Since this leads us to question the validity
of the System-GMM results, we prefer to use the fixed effects estimator in our regressions.15
Regarding the control variables, there is some evidence that mayors supported by majori-
ties in the Town Council and the Municipal Assembly make less optimistic forecasts. As
expected, better economic performance (lower unemployment rates or higher regional GDP
growth) leads to more optimistic forecasts. A less educated municipal population also seems
to be associated with more optimistic forecasts. The remaining control variables are gener-
ally insignificant.16
Interactions with political variables
The results of the estimation of the model of Equation (15), which interacts the election-year
dummy with several political variables, are reported in Table 3. To economize on space,
we only report the results for the coefficients of the election-year dummy, for the political
variable of interest, and for the interaction term. Since including several election dummies
14 See the Hansen and Difference-Hansen test results in Table E.2 in Appendix E. When we use the
Difference-GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), we also get Hansen test statistics that reject the
validity of the instrument matrix. The results of Difference-GMM estimations, which are available upon
request, are similar to those of System-GMM estimations.
15 It is worth noting that the System-GMM results, reported in Table E.2 in Appendix E, are very
similar to the fixed effects results of Table 2. In robustness tests (see Table E.5 in Appendix E), we use
other methods that deal with dynamic panel data, such as Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variables
(Bruno, 2005) and Bias-Corrected Fixed Effects (De Vos et al., 2015). Again, the results are very similar
to those of the fixed effects estimations.
16 The same happens to a dummy for independent mayors, when included, and with a dummy variable for
when the mayor’s party has a minority in both chambers (when included instead of the majority dummy).
These results are not shown here, but are available from the authors upon request.
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and their interactions would complicate the interpretation of the results, we only use the
election-year dummy. In the first estimations we, therefore, replicate the baseline model of
Equation (14), excluding the dummies for the years before and after the elections. Again,
the results clearly indicate electoral opportunism in the form of more optimistic revenue
forecasts in election years than in off-election years.
In the second set of estimations, we interact the election-year dummy with the win-margin
of the mayor’s party over the main opposition party in the previous elections. In the absence
of data on voting intentions for most municipalities, the margin of victory in the previous
election is our proxy for how close mayors expect the next elections to be.17 As expected
and consistent with Proposition 1, larger win-margins are associated with less optimistic
forecasts for total and capital effective revenues. Figure 1 shows the average marginal effects
of the election year, over the values of the win-margin (we omit values above 50, which are
roughly the highest 1%). The marginal effects are decreasing, and become insignificant for
win-margins close to or above 50 percentage points. That is, mayors may not feel the need
to behave opportunistically when they won the last elections by a very large margin.
The third set of estimation results corroborates our Proposition 2 which claims that a re-
duced ego rent (whose proxy is a dummy for not running again) leads to less opportunistic
behaviour. Obviously, forecast cycles would vanish, if the ego rent were to go away com-
pletely. This is actually what our empirical result suggests. Opportunistic (and optimistic)
total and capital effective revenue forecasts happen only when the mayor runs for reelection.
This is also consistent with the results of Veiga and Veiga (2007), who found that oppor-
tunism in actual capital and total expenditures is greater when the incumbent mayor runs
for reelection than when her party has a different candidate. This does not seem to matter
for current revenue forecasts.
Regarding the other estimations which test for interaction effects of other political control
17The correlation between the win-margins of the current and of the previous elections is 0.44. The win-
margin of the previous election is also highly statistically significant in a probit model for the probability
of reelection (results available upon request).
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Table 3: Interactions with Political Variables
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Effective Revenues Current Revenues Capital Revenues
Election year 84.868*** 4.518 79.661***
(6.509) (0.724) (7.328)
Election year 121.403*** 2.877 118.156***
(5.586) (0.325) (6.095)
Win-margin in the previous election 1.120 0.387* 0.732
(1.482) (1.753) (1.059)
Election year * Win-margin in the previous election -1.854** 0.083 -1.954***
(-2.459) (0.320) (-2.746)
Election year -1.975 17.631** -20.127
(-0.077) (1.988) (-0.855)
Incumbent running for reelection -44.888*** 2.378 -46.713***
(-2.953) (0.371) (-3.467)
Election year * Incumbent running for reelection 108.948*** -16.450* 125.197***
(3.977) (-1.674) (4.939)
Election year 95.485*** 0.636 94.868***
(4.647) (0.069) (5.970)
Mayor left -27.884 -7.514 -19.602
(-1.193) (-0.812) (-0.999)
Election year * Mayor left -19.960 7.301 -28.596
(-0.834) (0.869) (-1.471)
Election year 81.861** -2.670 84.352***
(2.253) (-0.163) (3.062)
Majority -41.516* -15.470 -25.147
(-1.688) (-1.551) (-1.258)
Election year * Majority 3.727 8.915 -5.814
(0.102) (0.629) (-0.201)
Election year 81.875*** -2.363 84.262***
(4.635) (-0.312) (5.974)
Same party 18.589 -3.057 22.341**
(1.578) (-0.741) (2.145)
Election year * Same party 7.045 16.214** -10.835
(0.296) (2.421) (-0.528)
Observations 5,098 5,098 5,098
Municipalities 308 308 308
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The
dependent variable is the difference between the revenue forecast for year t and the average revenues of the previous four
years, in real euros per capita. All regressions include the full set of control variables of Table 2, except the dummies for the
years before and after elections. T-statistics are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure 1: Effects of the Win-Margin on the Average Marginal Effects of the Election Year
(vertical axis reports revenue forecast manipulation in real euros (of 2015) per capita)
variables, there is no robust indication that the ideology of the mayor, the support of
majorities in the Town Council and Municipal Assembly, or party similarity between the
mayor and the prime minister affect the magnitude of the opportunistic management of
revenue forecasts.
Effects of Education on the Magnitude of PBCs
The estimation of the model of Equation (16) tests Proposition 3 by interacting the election
year dummy with several proxies of the education level of the municipal population at least
15 years old. The results are reported in Table 4. To economize on space, we only report
the coefficients for the election year, the education proxy, and its interaction. Four variables
representing the education level of the municipal population are used: the percentage of the
population with no formal education level completed; the percentage of the population with
incomplete secondary education; the percentage of the population with at least completed
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secondary education; and, the Marktest’s Education Index.18
Table 4: Education and the Magnitude of Election-year Opportunism
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Effective Revenues Current Revenues Capital Revenues
Election year -32.577 -29.888*** -2.308
(-1.128) (-3.539) (-0.087)
% Population with no education level completed 28.840*** 1.959 25.318***
(5.245) (0.952) (4.527)
Election year * % Population with 9.080*** 2.797*** 6.197***
no education level completed (4.217) (4.796) (3.131)
Election year -42.484 -28.010*** -13.551
(-1.593) (-2.845) (-0.611)
% Population with incomplete secondary education 22.182*** 1.325 19.591***
(5.243) (0.855) (4.711)
Election year * % Population with 8.986*** 2.591*** 6.309***
incomplete secondary education (4.700) (4.967) (3.728)
Election year 209.222*** 58.725*** 149.543***
(7.429) (6.211) (6.106)
% Population with at least completed secondary education -20.027** 3.027 -21.311***
(-2.518) (1.138) (-3.106)
Election year * % Population with at least -14.848*** -5.949*** -8.815***
completed secondary education (-5.668) (-5.131) (-4.239)
Observations 5,098 5,098 5,098
Municipalities 308 308 308
Election year 70.358*** 8.450 63.515***
(5.221) (1.563) (6.222)
Education index 7.644** 2.770 4.402**
(2.086) (1.161) (2.322)
Election year * Educcation index -4.813*** -0.944*** -3.901***
(-6.739) (-3.574) (-6.342)
Observations 4,698 4,698 4,698
Municipalities 278 278 278
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent
variable is the difference between the revenue forecast for year t and the average revenues of the previous four years, in real
euros per capita. All regressions include the full set of control variables of Table 2, except the dummies for the years before
and after elections. T-statistics are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Regardless of the education proxy used, the results of Table 4 clearly support Proposition 3,
18 When calculating the percentages of the population, we only consider people with at least 15 years
old. We would prefer to consider the population old enough to vote (at least 18 years old), but there is no
data for that age range. The Education Index (I´ndice Geral de Ensino), provided by the firm Marktest, is
a weighted average of education variables.
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indicating that lower education levels are associated with more optimistic revenue forecasts
in election years. This is also consistent with the model of Shi and Svensson (2006), accord-
ing to which opportunism is greater when there is a higher percentage of uninformed voters.
Since the coefficients of interactions with continuous variables are sometimes difficult to
interpret, we illustrate them in Figure 2, for the first and fourth education proxies.
As can be seen in the graphs on the left hand side, the marginal effect of the election
year becomes positive for total effective and capital revenues when the percentage of the
population at least 15 years old which did not complete any formal education level is close
to or above 15 percent. On the right-hand-side graphs, we see that lower values of the
education index are associated with higher marginal effects of the election year, that is,
with greater opportunism.
Robustness Tests
The robustness of our empirical results is checked in several ways.19 First, we use two
alternative definitions of the dependent variable: (1) the difference between the forecasted
revenues for year t and the average revenues of the last eight years (instead of the last four
years); and (2), the forecast error, that is, the difference between the forecasted and the
actual revenues for year t. The results of these robustness checks, reported in Table E.3 of
Appendix E, are very similar to those of Tables 2, 3 and 4, providing further support for
our theoretical model’s main result and for the three propositions.
Second, we check if the results are sensitive to two sample restrictions: (1) excluding the 30
municipalities of the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira, as they have regional governments;
and (2), excluding term-limited mayors from the sample (term limits only became binding
in the 2013 elections), as they have smaller incentives to behave opportunistically in election
years. The results, reported in Table E.4, are again very similar to those of the main tables.
19 The robustness tests’ results are shown in tables only. Nevertheless, the respective figures are similar
to those shown above; they are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 2: Effects of Education on the Average Marginal Effects of the Election Year (vertical
axis reports revenue forecast manipulation in real euros per capita)
Third, we check if the results hold for two estimation methods/models designed for dynamic
panel data: the Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variables (BC-LSDV) estimators,
developed by Bruno (2005); and the Bias-Corrected Fixed Effects, of De Vos et al. (2015).
These are good alternatives to System-GMM, especially for unbalanced data such as ours.
Again, as shown in Table E.5 of Appendix E, the results are very similar to those of Tables 2,
3 and 4, which indicates that our results are not sensitive to the estimation method/model
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chosen.20
Fourth, we test our three propositions at the same time, rather than in separate regressions.
That is, the three interactions with the dummy variable for the election year were included
simultaneously in the list of explanatory variables. In fact, we do this for two different
education proxies. As shown in Table E.6, the results again support all three propositions,
indicating that it does not matter whether we test them separately or jointly.
Finaly, we control for time effects using year dummy variables, instead of 4-year mandate
dummies. This change has the drawback of forcing the exclusion of the dummy variable
for the election year, but has the advantage of accounting for other events that may have
happened in specific election years. In Table E.7, we report the results for the baseline
regressions. Except for 2013, the coefficients of the year dummies in election years are
always higher than for the previous years of the same electoral term in the estimations for
total and capital effective revenues. At the bottom of the table, we report the average effects
in election and non-election years, with the former always being higher than the latter. In
fact, the difference in the averages is always statistically significant with a positive sign,
providing additional support for the hypothesis that there are Political Budget Cycles in
revenue forecasts. The results for the interactions with political and education variables
are reported in Table E.8. They support the findings of Tables 3 and 4, thereby indicating
that a larger win margin in the previous election reduces opportunism, while it increases
for greater shares of the municipal population with no education level completed. However,
there is no longer support for the hypothesis of increased opportunism when the incumbent
mayor is running for reelection.
20 We also estimated a static Fixed Effects model, excluding the lagged dependent variable from the list
of explanatory variables. The results, not shown here but available upon request, are again very similar to
those of the main tables.
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5 Conclusion
This paper presents a political economy model which is consistent with the evidence (Boylan,
2008; Heinemann, 2006; Boukari and Veiga, 2018) indicating that governments use overly
optimistic revenue forecasts to expand their fiscal room for manoeuvre in election years in
order to increase their chances of re-election. Besides offering a theoretical mechanism which
can explain the results found in the aforementioned studies, this paper also investigates the
factors that affect the magnitude of the forecast manipulation. The three propositions
derived from the model indicate that: (1) a larger ex ante expected winning margin allows
the incumbent to reduce its revenue forecast; (2) when the incumbent government is not
running, its own interest in winning the elections is reduced, and so is the opportunistic
manipulation; and, (3) if there are more uninformed voters, any manipulation is more
effective.
These theoretical findings are supported by an empirical analysis based on data from Por-
tuguese municipalities for the period 1998-2015. In fact, we find evidence supporting our
theoretical predictions, both in the main results and in a battery of robustness tests. That
is, our results clearly indicate that there is revenue forecast manipulation in election years
and that the manipulation is smaller for a higher win margin at the previous elections (our
proxy for the expected win margin), when the incumbent mayor does not run for re-election,
and for a lower education level of the municipal population (our proxy for the percentage
of uninformed voters).
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Appendix and Indications for the Referees
The appendix presents indications for the model solution and the derivation of the propo-
sitions in Section 2. It also presents descriptive statistics and additional empirical results.
A Probability of individual agent to vote for the incumbent
First, we consider an individual voter, no matter if informed or uninformed. She votes for
incumbent a, if
Et[ut+1(c
a
t+1) +G
+
t+1
a
+ α(θi − γ)(−1
2
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. utility when a in power
≥ Et[ut+1(cbt+1) +G+t+1b + α(θi − γ)(+
1
2
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. utility when b in power
.(A.1)
Depending on who is in power in (t+ 1), the additional provision of public goods in Equa-
tion (A.1) will typically differ because of differences in politicians’ competence and voters’
expectations thereof:
Et[G
+
t+1
j
] = −Et[(1 + rt)Dt] + Et[ηjt+1], j = a, b. (A.2)
The equation says that the period t deficit must be repaid in period (t + 1). However, the
politician will be expected not to borrow in period (t+1) because there is no election at the
end of that period.21 The best revenue forecast for the incumbent in (t + 1) is, therefore,
(R+t+1
forec
)j = Et[(R
+
t+1)
j] = 0. Overall, there are probably no additional public goods in
(t + 1); instead public goods are likely to be reduced corresponding to deficit repayment
modulo the effect of the politician’s competence. Agents have no idea about the skills shock
of either potential politician in t+ 1. Nor do they know the skills shock of the challenger in
period t, and, therefore, expect 0. However, they can use the incumbent’s period t public
goods provision policy to draw conclusions about her period t skills shock, µat . (How this is
done is not shown here, but further down; the difference between informed and uninformed
voters will then be exploited.)
Et[G
+
t+1
b
] = −Et[(1 + rt)Dt]; (A.3)
Et[G
+
t+1
a
] = −Et[(1 + rt)Dt] + Et[µat ]; (A.4)
21 Note that they will probably end up with a deficit or surplus though because the actual additional
revenue depends on the deviation from trend output, y+t , which is a random variable. See also the discussion
on the timing of events on page 6.
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Since overestimation of additional revenue has no effect in an off-election year, private
consumption in Equation (A.1) is the same irrespective of the politician in power:
Et[ut+1(c
a
t+1)] = Et[ut+1(c
b
t+1)]. (A.5)
Combining Equations (A.1) and (A.3) to (A.5) we can obtain a condition for an individual
to vote for incumbent a (which corresponds to Condition (8) in the main text):
Et[µ
a
t ] ≥ α(θi − γ). (A.6)
Using the distribution of the skills shock we can determine the probability (Pr) of any voter,
be she informed or uninformed, to vote for incumbent a:
Pr[Et[µ
a
t ]− α(θi − γ) ≥ 0] =
Et[µ
a
t ]− α(−1− γ)
α(1− γ)− α(−1− γ) =
Et[µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1 + γ
2
. (A.7)
B Probability of incumbent to win
Now, we can determine the probability Prob that incumbent a obtains 50% of the votes in
the period t elections. It is the probability that the number of voters times their individual
probability Pr to vote for incumbent a (as determined in Equation A.7) is greater or equal
to 1
2
. However, the individual probability Pr is different for informed and uninformed voters
because their expectations of period t skills, Et[µ
a
t ], differ. The probability for the incumbent
to win the election – Equation (9) in the main text – is repeated here:
Prob
 (1− ψ) [
Einft [µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1 + γ
2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
informed
+ψ [
Euninft [µ
a
t ]
2α
+
1 + γ
2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
uninformed
≥ 1
2
 . (B.1)
So why is there a difference in expectations for informed and uninformed voters? Rewrite
the government budget constrain (4) for period t:
G+t = R
+
t
forec − (1 + rt−1)(Dt−1) + µat + µat−1. (B.2)
For informed voters we obtain:
Einft [µ
a
t ] = µ
a
t = G
+
t −R+t forec + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − µat−1. (B.3)
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Additional public goods Gt, previous period deficit Dt−1, previous period skills µat−1, and
interest rate rt−1 can be observed by everybody. The point is that informed voters can
determine Einft [µ
a
t ] deterministically, because they can also observe the incumbent’s revenue
forecast, R+t
forec
. By contrast, uninformed voters must form an estimate of the incumbent’s
skills, µ̂at , based on their perception of the government’s revenue forecast R̂
+
t
forec
:
Euninft [µ
a
t ] = µ̂
a
t = G
+
t − R̂+t forec + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − µat−1
= G+t −R+t forec + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − µat−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
µat from (B.3)
+(R+t
forec − R̂+t forec);
Euninft [µ
a
t ] = µ
a
t + (R
+
t
forec − R̂+t forec). (B.4)
Uninformed voters overestimate the incumbent’s skills by R+t
forec−R̂+t forec. Using Equations
(B.3) and (B.4) we can now determine the probability Probwin that incumbent a receives
50% of the votes in period t:
Probwin ≡ Prob
 (1− ψ) [µat2α + 1 + γ2 ] + ψ [µat +R+t
forec − R̂+t forec
2α
+
1 + γ
2
] ≥ 1
2

= Prob
µat2α + ψ R+t
forec − R̂+t forec
2α
+
1 + γ
2
≥ 1
2
 ;
Probwin = Prob
{
µat ≥ ψ (R̂+t forec −R+t forec)− αγ
}
(B.5)
= 1 − F [ ψ (R̂+t forec −R+t forec) − αγ] , (B.6)
where F (•) is the distribution function of the skills shock. Equations (B.5) and (B.6) are
identical to Equations (10) and (11)in the main text.
Figure 1: Bell-shaped skills density function as an example
The marked area towards the right (light grey or yellow [if in colour]) under the density
function depicted in the figure corresponds to the probability described by Equation (B.5)
32
and by the distribution function representation in Equation (B.6). If the ex ante winning
chances are the same for incumbent and challenger (shift parameter γ = 0), then the
expected skills overall (combine Equations B.3 and B.4) is always greater than the actual
skills, if the government’s revenue estimate perceived by uninformed voters is smaller than
the actual government revenue estimate (R̂+t
forec
< R+t
forec
). Then the probability (see
Equation (B.6) or the light grey [or yellow] area under the density function) is always greater
than 1
2
. An overly optimistic (manipulated) revenue forecast increases the government’s
chance to be re-elected. (A similar effect occurs, if uninformed voters were to reduce their
perception of the government revenue forecast for some reason.) If the ex ante winning
changes for incumbent a are larger (γ < 0), the government needs less forecast manipulation
to achieve the same effect.
C Incumbent’s maximisation problem
Now, we can maximise incumbent a’s utility over the entire election cycle, i.e. periods t
and t+ 1. Period t+ 1 utility is the sum of the utilities for winning and losing the election
weighted by the probability determined in the previous step. A condensed version of the
following equation is also found as Equation 12 in the main text.
max
R+t
forec V = max
R+t
forec V at + V
a
t+1 =
max
R+t
forec Eat {ut(y¯ + (1− τ)
R+t
τ
) +R+t
forec − (1 + rt−1)(Dt−1) + ηat︸ ︷︷ ︸
G+t (eq. 4)
+Xt − ξD2t−1}
+ Eat {[1− F [ψ(R̂+t forec −R+t forec)− αγ]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob. incumbent wins
[ut+1(y¯ + (1− τ)R
+
t+1
τ
) + (R+t+1
forec
)
a − (1 + rt)Dt + ηat+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gat+1
+Xt+1 − ξD2t ]}
+ Eat {[F [ψ(R̂+t forec −R+t forec)− αγ]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob. incumbent loses
[ut+1(y¯ + (1− τ)R
+
t+1
τ
) + (R+t+1
forec
)
b − (1 + rt)Dt + ηbt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gbt+1
]}. (C.1)
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Next, substitute in for the expected current debt (Eat [Dt] = R
+
t
forec
); simplify expectations
when they are zero (expectations of the additional revenue shocks, Eat [R
+
t ] = E
a
t [R
+
t+1] =
0; and expectations of the optimal future additional revenue forecast, Eat [(R
+
t+1
forec
)
a
] =
Eat [(R
+
t+1
forec
)
b
] = 0); and acknowledge that the incumbent knows her past, but not her
present and future skills, nor the skills shocks of the challenger (Eat [η
a
t ] = E
a
t [µ
a
t−1]+E
a
t [µ
a
t ] =
Eat [µ
a
t−1]+0; and E
a
t [η
a
t+1] = E
a
t [η
b
t+1] = 0). Now, the maximisation problem looks as follows:
max
R+t
forec ct(y¯) + ct+1(y¯) +R
+
t
forec − (1 + rt−1Dt−1 + µat−1 +Xt − ξD2t−1 − (1 + rt−1)(R+t forec)
+ [1− F [ψ(R̂+t forec −R+t forec)− αγ]] [Xt+1 − ξ(R+t forec)2]. (C.2)
Having verified the second order condition for a well-behaved maximisation problem we can
work from the following first order condition:
−rt + F ′[ψ(R̂+t forec −R+t forec)− αγ]ψ[Xt+1 − ξ(R+t forec)2]
−[1− F [ψ(R̂+t forec −R+t forec)− αγ]]2ξR+t forec = 0, (C.3)
where F ′[•] = f [•] refers to the probability density function. In equilibrium, this becomes
rational expectations condition (13) in the main text which is repeated here:
−rt + F ′[−αγ]ψ[Xt+1 − ξ(R+t forec)2]− [1− F [−αγ]]2ξR+t forec = 0, (C.4)
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D Perturbation Results for Propositions
The propositions at the end of Section ?? are obtained by using the Implicit Function
Theorem. The derivations of the marginal effect of changes in exogenous variables on the
equilibrium value of the government’s optimal choice of the revenue forecast (R+t
forec
)
∗
are
given here:
Proposition 1:
d(R+t
forec
)
∗
dγ
= −
V
R+t
forec
γ
V
R+t
forec
R+t
forec
= − −αF
′′[•]ψ[Xt+1 − ξ(R+t forec)2]− αF ′[•]2ξR+t forec
−ψF ′′[•]ψ[Xt+1 − ξ(R+t forec)2]− 2ψF ′[•]2ξR+t forec − (1− F [•])2ξ
< 0. (D.1)
Proposition 2:
d(R+t
forec
)
∗
dXt+1
= −
V
R+t
forec
Xt+1
V
R+t
forec
R+t
forec
= − F
′[•]ψ
−ψF ′′[•]ψ[Xt+1 − ξ(R+t forec)2]− 2ψF ′[•]2ξR+t forec − (1− F [•])2ξ
> 0. (D.2)
Proposition 3:
d(R+t
forec
)
∗
dψ
= −
V
R+t
forec
ψ
V
R+t
forec
R+t
forec
= −∆RF
′′[•]ψ[Xt+1 − ξ(R+t forec)2] + F ′[•][Xt+1 − ξ(R+t forec)2] + ∆RF ′[•]2ξR+t forec
−ψF ′′[•]ψ[Xt+1 − ξ(R+t forec)2]− 2ψF ′[•]2ξR+t forec − (1− F [•])2ξ
> 0; where ∆R ≡ (R̂+t forec −R+t forec) = 0 under rational expectations. (D.3)
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E Descriptive Statistics and Robustness Tests
This subsection presents the descriptive statistics and the results of several robustness tests.
Table E.1: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES Observ. Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.
Forecasted effective revenues minus the average of the last 4 years 5,098.00 574.40 608.43 -1,238.08 7,338.58
Forecasted current revenues minus the average of the last 4 years 5,098.00 162.34 212.45 -341.71 4,627.03
Forecasted capital revenues minus the average of the last 4 years 5,098.00 411.79 505.82 -1,843.98 7,083.89
Year before elections 5,098.00 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Election year 5,098.00 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Year after elections 5,098.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Mayor left (PS, PCP, or BE) 5,098.00 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
Majority (in the Town Hall and Municipal Assembly) 5,098.00 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00
Win margin (in percentage points) in the previous election 5,098.00 19.72 14.03 0.02 75.75
Run for reelection 5,098.00 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
Terms mayor 5,098.00 2.37 1.71 0.00 10.00
Same party (mayor and prime minister) 5,098.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Unemployment rate 5,098.00 6.87 2.81 0.64 18.48
GDP growth (NUTS 3 region) 5,098.00 1.09 3.67 -15.65 25.94
Population growth rate 5,098.00 -0.30 2.15 -21.56 24.98
Financial autonomy (own revenues as % of effective) 5,098.00 35.91 19.17 1.14 124.75
% Population with no education level completed 5,098.00 13.89 5.39 2.21 37.58
% Population with less than complete secondary education 5,098.00 13.84 5.70 0.51 38.60
% Population with complete secondary education 5,098.00 9.02 3.39 1.96 23.52
Education index 4,698.00 3.59 7.38 0.16 109.04
Sources: Directorate General for Local Authorities (DGAL), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI), National Statistics Institute
(INE), and Marktest’s Sales Index database.
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Table E.2: PBCs in Revenue Forecasts - Baseline Results (Using System-GMM)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Effective Revenues Current Revenues Capital Revenues
L.(Forecast - Average of 4 Previous Forecasts) 0.728*** 0.530*** 0.674***
(6.850) (3.853) (8.937)
Year before election 26.407 -17.716*** 19.976
(1.156) (-2.860) (1.337)
Election year 93.680*** 21.453*** 58.425***
(3.923) (4.054) (3.292)
Year after election 16.616 24.269*** -11.574
(1.094) (3.638) (-0.913)
Mayor left -23.132 4.955 -25.961*
(-1.157) (0.538) (-1.656)
Majority 1.259 -3.676 1.208
(0.054) (-0.383) (0.065)
Win margin (previous election) -0.414 0.087 -0.452
(-0.649) (0.308) (-0.860)
Run for reelection -2.823 0.112 -11.854
(-0.141) (0.012) (-0.735)
Terms mayor 3.037 -0.824 -0.819
(0.467) (-0.286) (-0.165)
Same party 11.395 1.576 8.542
(0.862) (0.340) (0.748)
L.Unemployment rate -17.501* -8.294** -15.977**
(-1.860) (-2.288) (-2.054)
L.GDP growth (NUTS III region) 11.058* 1.090 6.250
(1.723) (1.015) (1.179)
L.Population growth 9.137 -30.722*** 25.343***
(0.902) (-7.379) (3.092)
L.Financial autonomy (Own revenues / Effective revenues) -0.611 0.368 -0.907*
(-0.732) (1.015) (-1.664)
L.% Population with no education level completed 9.454** 2.193*** 9.214***
(2.499) (2.704) (3.569)
Observations 5,098 5,098 5,098
Municipalities 308 308 308
No. of instruments 24.00 24.00 24.00
Arellano-Bond AR(1), p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01
Arellano-Bond AR(2), p-value 0.40 0.36 0.37
Hansen, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Diff Hansen 1, p-value 0.03 0.00 0.01
Diff Hansen 2, p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00
Notes: System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel data models. Constant and time dummies are not shown for brevity. The
dependent variable and the economic and demographic control variables were treated as endogenous. Only one lag was used
as an internal instrument to reduce the number of instruments. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Diff-Hansen 1 tests
the exogeneity of the instruments used in the level part (of the system) as a whole. Diff-Hansen 2 tests the exogeneity of the
lagged level of the dependent variable used as an instrument in the level part. The dependent variable is the difference between
the revenue forecast for year t and the average revenues of the previous four years, in real euros per capita. T-statistics are in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table E.3: Robustness tests - Alternative Definitions of the Dependent Variable
Difference to 8-year average revenues Forecast Errors in Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effective Current Capital Effective Current Capital
VARIABLES Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues
Year before election 20.631 -10.048* 30.218** 39.723*** 2.552 37.347***
(1.335) (-1.902) (2.274) (2.841) (0.479) (3.043)
Election year 103.497*** 5.172 96.971*** 96.806*** -0.939 98.365***
(6.400) (1.002) (6.684) (6.579) (-0.226) (7.267)
Year after election 15.660 16.813*** -2.326 18.142 -4.958 21.117
(0.919) (3.116) (-0.150) (1.145) (-1.073) (1.547)
Election year 131.168*** 8.477 122.801*** 116.041*** 3.307 113.787***
(6.100) (0.992) (6.452) (5.863) (0.425) (6.472)
Win margin (previous election) 1.577** 0.489** 1.091 1.462** 0.417* 1.056*
(1.992) (2.134) (1.514) (2.078) (1.738) (1.664)
Election year * Win margin -2.101*** -0.025 -2.126*** -2.236*** -0.245 -2.002***
(previous election) (-2.812) (-0.096) (-3.041) (-3.290) (-0.859) (-3.125)
Election year 1.818 13.222 -12.335 3.328 -25.934*** 31.410
(0.073) (1.434) (-0.543) (0.134) (-2.725) (1.513)
Incumbent running for reelection -41.846*** -0.508 -40.993*** -32.233** -7.256 -24.007**
(-2.854) (-0.078) (-3.206) (-2.403) (-1.159) (-2.156)
Election year * Incumbent running 110.345*** -6.564 116.997*** 86.130*** 30.616*** 53.870**
for reelection (4.133) (-0.706) (4.769) (3.310) (2.736) (2.556)
Election year -29.007 -15.969* -11.993 -21.230 -22.519** 3.591
(-0.984) (-1.857) (-0.453) (-0.786) (-2.512) (0.150)
% Population with no education 31.180*** -1.221 30.635*** 21.822*** 0.147 21.066***
level completed (5.328) (-0.501) (5.034) (4.400) (0.084) (4.487)
Election year * % Population with no 9.181*** 1.966*** 7.065*** 6.983*** 1.552** 5.317***
education level completed (4.183) (3.408) (3.494) (3.382) (2.534) (2.795)
Observations 5,088 5,088 5,088 5,098 5,098 5,098
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent
variable is defined as indicated in the first row (measured in real euros per capita). All regressions include the full set of control
variables used in Tables 2, 3, and 4. T-statistics are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table E.4: Robustness tests - Restricted Samples
Excluding Azores and Madeira Excluding Term-Limited Mayors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effective Current Capital Effective Current Capital
VARIABLES Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues
Year before election 20.632 -14.435*** 34.003*** 10.015 -17.178*** 26.627*
(1.548) (-2.659) (3.090) (0.623) (-3.517) (1.880)
Election year 92.573*** -3.147 92.967*** 111.447*** -3.183 112.848***
(5.983) (-0.573) (6.587) (6.701) (-0.521) (7.472)
Year after election 21.387 15.693*** 6.086 -22.271 3.876 -28.267
(1.577) (2.775) (0.519) (-0.977) (0.603) (-1.322)
Election year 105.861*** 1.445 102.585*** 125.317*** 3.290 121.099***
(5.316) (0.152) (5.945) (5.769) (0.322) (6.255)
Win margin (previous election) 0.598 0.332 0.270 0.356 0.265 0.087
(0.946) (1.371) (0.487) (0.409) (1.209) (0.107)
Election year * Win margin -1.431** 0.052 -1.501** -0.862 0.136 -1.009
(previous election) (-1.973) (0.187) (-2.235) (-1.136) (0.498) (-1.390)
Election year -31.212 10.609 -43.900* 84.364** 25.763** 57.883*
(-1.353) (1.199) (-1.968) (2.494) (2.291) (1.894)
Incumbent running for reelection -45.901*** 1.373 -45.874*** -14.305 5.140 -18.934
(-3.065) (0.206) (-3.650) (-0.495) (0.639) (-0.645)
Election year * Incumbent running 136.230*** -10.165 146.283*** 27.530 -22.141* 49.203
for reelection (5.080) (-1.042) (5.696) (0.784) (-1.676) (1.526)
Election year -84.720*** -33.460*** -51.384** -9.585 -32.510*** 22.514
(-3.370) (-3.681) (-2.267) (-0.336) (-3.250) (0.856)
% Population with no education 24.205*** 0.189 20.479*** 27.103*** 1.621 23.465***
level completed (5.657) (0.082) (5.485) (4.291) (0.610) (3.536)
Election year * % Population with no 12.061*** 2.873*** 9.017*** 8.705*** 2.876*** 5.768***
education level completed (5.850) (4.631) (4.754) (3.964) (5.250) (2.798)
Observations 4,708 4,708 4,708 4,172 4,172 4,172
Municipalities 278 278 278 308 308 308
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent
variable is the difference between the revenue forecast for year t and the average revenues of the previous four years, in real euros
per capita. All regressions include the full set of control variables used in Tables 2, 3, and 4.. T-statistics are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table E.5: Robustness Tests - Dynamic Panel Models
Bias Corrected - LSDV Bias-Corrrected Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effective Current Capital Effective Current Capital
VARIABLES Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues
Year before election 17.586 -13.134 30.101 1.131 -22.832*** 24.004
(0.793) (-1.548) (1.560) (0.072) (-3.419) (1.596)
Election year 98.309*** 0.348 96.619*** 85.137*** 1.008 84.972***
(4.313) (0.040) (4.873) (4.853) (0.199) (4.896)
Year after election 4.156 15.891* -12.751 8.391 12.719** -5.091
(0.186) (1.840) (-0.659) (0.444) (2.120) (-0.291)
Election year 125.922*** 2.645 122.664*** 130.811*** 12.415* 119.023***
(4.370) (0.239) (4.893) (6.407) (1.673) (4.755)
Win margin (previous election) 1.110 0.402 0.707 0.659 0.301 0.335
(1.309) (1.235) (0.959) (1.067) (1.360) (0.477)
Election year * Win margin -1.898 0.088 -2.000* -2.443*** -0.120 -2.308***
(previous election) (-1.559) (0.188) (-1.891) (-2.828) (-0.396) (-2.613)
Election year 1.663 18.092 -17.161 -29.800 22.432* -51.298**
(0.044) (1.245) (-0.525) (-0.950) (1.737) (-2.007)
Incumbent running for reelection -41.848* 1.935 -43.194** -48.152*** -3.883 -44.916***
(-1.739) (0.209) (-2.066) (-2.806) (-0.608) (-2.942)
Election year * Incumbent running 108.919*** -17.196 125.937*** 143.641*** -15.771 159.417***
for reelection (2.658) (-1.089) (3.543) (4.093) (-1.223) (5.422)
Election year -23.310 -28.995* 5.782 -24.400 -43.808*** 20.609
(-0.555) (-1.797) (0.158) (-0.697) (-3.401) (0.655)
% Population with no education 26.377*** 1.421 23.351*** 22.471*** 6.631*** 16.068***
level completed (3.338) (0.478) (3.374) (3.858) (3.881) (2.736)
Election year * % Population with no 8.656*** 2.718*** 5.859*** 9.193*** 4.805*** 4.379*
education level completed (3.770) (3.068) (2.937) (3.373) (6.166) (1.795)
Observations 5,098 5,098 5,098 4,018 4,018 4,018
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308
Notes: The dependent variable is the difference between the revenue forecast for year t and the average revenues of the previous
four years, in real euros per capita. All regressions include the full set of control variables used in Tables 2, 3, and 4.. T-statistics
are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table E.6: Robustness tests - Joint Test of the Three Propositions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effective Current Capital Effective Current Capital
VARIABLES Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues Revenues
Election year -69.058 -15.943 -52.278 -3.437 17.086* -17.848
(-1.589) (-1.392) (-1.266) (-0.113) (1.794) (-0.600)
Win margin (previous election) 1.089 0.426* 0.658 0.727 0.395 0.329
(1.428) (1.908) (0.946) (0.953) (1.643) (0.491)
Election year * Win margin -1.663** 0.002 -1.680** -1.299* 0.075 -1.392*
(previous election) (-2.156) (0.007) (-2.289) (-1.770) (0.273) (-1.967)
Incumbent running for reelection -39.738*** 3.544 -42.799*** -46.032*** 1.432 -45.224***
(-2.635) (0.561) (-3.190) (-3.105) (0.216) (-3.570)
Election year * Incumbent running 94.720*** -19.489** 113.975*** 125.155*** -12.728 136.998***
for reelection (3.470) (-2.055) (4.460) (4.461) (-1.286) (5.099)
% Population with no education 28.889*** 1.945 25.382***
level completed (5.253) (0.945) (4.539)
Election year * % Population with no 8.626*** 2.911*** 5.630***
education level completed (4.083) (5.070) (2.907)
Education index 7.578** 2.781 4.330**
(2.058) (1.164) (2.224)
Election year * Education index -5.102*** -0.920*** -4.215***
(-6.641) (-3.508) (-6.214)
Observations 5,098 5,098 5,098 4,698 4,698 4,698
Municipalities 308 308 308 278 278 278
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.24 0.50 0.50 0.23 0.58
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent
variable is the difference between the revenue forecast for year t and the average revenues of the previous four years, in real
euros per capita. All regressions include the full set of control variables used in Table 2. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table E.7: Robustness Tests - Baseline Results with Year Dummies
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Effective Revenues Current Revenues Capital Revenues
L.(Revenue forecast - Average revenues of previous 4 years) 0.514*** 0.462*** 0.540***
(8.977) (4.798) (9.270)
Mayor left -34.504 -5.589 -28.337
(-1.512) (-0.644) (-1.465)
Majority -40.577* -13.114* -26.583
(-1.927) (-1.652) (-1.465)
Win margin (previous election) 0.691 0.384* 0.295
(0.930) (1.809) (0.446)
Incumbent running for reelection -22.216 -1.208 -20.218
(-1.159) (-0.181) (-1.174)
Terms mayor -5.388 0.292 -5.527
(-0.913) (0.153) (-1.042)
Same party 22.867** 3.425 19.721**
(2.049) (0.875) (1.974)
L.Unemployment rate -7.240* -2.234 -4.598
(-1.834) (-1.578) (-1.255)
L.GDP growth (NUTS III region) 2.804 1.269* 1.738
(1.342) (1.881) (0.899)
L.Population growth -0.922 -4.470** 3.232
(-0.311) (-2.489) (1.329)
L.Financial autonomy (Own revenues / Effective revenues) -0.257 -0.649 0.584
(-0.235) (-1.590) (0.615)
L.% Population with no education level completed 27.676*** -2.489 28.443***
(4.748) (-1.125) (4.859)
2000 95.390*** 15.067 80.746***
(2.868) (0.868) (3.552)
2001 (election year) 182.526*** 6.319 175.312***
(6.936) (0.767) (7.335)
2002 2.065 -9.736 5.160
(0.061) (-1.196) (0.162)
2003 75.857** -25.765*** 99.192***
(2.241) (-3.001) (3.129)
2004 129.865*** -3.335 127.972***
(4.045) (-0.347) (4.519)
2005 (election year) 212.563*** -3.238 209.402***
(6.241) (-0.311) (6.774)
2006 145.689*** -27.853** 162.495***
(3.185) (-2.442) (3.667)
2007 135.613*** -1.133 125.250***
(3.069) (-0.082) (2.938)
2008 168.661*** 8.018 151.875***
(4.238) (0.597) (3.935)
2009 (election year) 362.261*** 68.096*** 286.401***
(7.607) (4.342) (6.488)
– continued on next page –
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Effective Revenues Current Revenues Capital Revenues
2010 282.591*** 31.450* 242.948***
(5.952) (1.902) (5.603)
2011 210.529*** -31.687** 233.223***
(3.372) (-2.142) (3.925)
2012 173.746*** -22.229 184.080***
(2.892) (-1.250) (3.330)
2013 (election year) 46.924 22.480 12.379
(0.718) (1.113) (0.199)
2014 45.003 18.637 19.428
(0.817) (0.858) (0.395)
2015 90.996 36.790* 50.228
(1.579) (1.724) (0.949)
2016 33.934 -42.316* 73.357
(0.576) (-1.821) (1.348)
2017 (election year) 184.016*** -62.892*** 241.340***
(2.998) (-2.698) (4.189)
Election years (average) 197.658*** 6.153 184.967***
(4.858) (0.447) (4.811)
Non-election years (average) 122.303*** -4.161 119.689***
(3.242) (-0.359) (3.389)
(Election years - Non-election years) 75.355*** 10.314* 65.278***
(5.788) (1.841) (6.107)
Observations 5,098 5,098 5,098
Municipalities 308 308 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.27 0.52
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent
variable is the difference between the revenue forecast for year t and the average revenues of the previous four years, in real
euros per capita. T-statistics are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table E.8: Interactions with Political Variables and Education (using Year Dummies)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Effective Revenues Current Revenues Capital Revenues
Election years - Non-election years 75.655*** 10.298* 65.587***
(5.808) (1.828) (6.154)
Election years - Non-election years 101.649*** 11.325 90.875***
(4.580) (1.396) (4.638)
Win margin (previous election) 1.000 0.404* 0.592
(1.334) (1.844) (0.864)
Election year * Win margin (previous election) -1.316* -0.052 -1.280*
(-1.760) (-0.211) (-1.829)
Election years - Non-election years 80.231*** 17.831** 63.299***
(3.171) (2.281) (2.704)
Incumbent running for reelection -11.164 0.806 -11.222
(-0.728) (0.126) (-0.834)
Election year * Incumbent running for reelection -5.787 -9.529 2.892
(-0.210) (-0.958) (0.116)
Election years - Non-election years -1.199 -2.116 3.753
(-0.029) (-0.200) (0.102)
% Population with no education 30.161*** 0.435 28.059***
level completed (5.107) (0.201) (4.707)
Election year * % Population with no education level 5.897** 1.004 4.698*
completed (1.995) (1.540) (1.739)
Observations 5,098 5,098 5,098
Municipalities 308 308 308
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent
variable is defined as indicated in the first row (measured in real euros per capita). All regressions include the full set of control
variables used in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Time effects are controlled for with year dummies. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. ”Election years - Non-election years” stands for the difference between the averages of the
coefficients of year dummies for election years (2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, and 2017) and for non-election years.
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